In spite of the discredited notions of determinism during the last two decades, the idea of technological determinism strikes again, based on the social impacts of modern technology. The main objective of this article attempts to study the relation between civilization, modern technology, and development. To attain our objective, the debate is presented on the issue of whether the current management of technology contributes to the guidance of technological development on the basis of "social priorities."
In 1997, the Bulletin of Science, Technology & Soci- ety (Vols. 1-3) promoted a debate, based on Winner's (1997a) statements of technological determinism as the belief that modern technology is a univocal, a unilinear, and a self-augmenting force that is alive and kicking. Winner (1997a) pointed out that if we review the literature of a wide variety of technical fields, we can find that the language of momentum, trajectory, technical imperatives, and determinism is more recurrent nowdays than in the "naive" 1950s.
Some criticism of Winner's (1997a) ideas focuses on his underestimation of historical reconstruction (in which we presumably know the outcomes). Fleming (1997) was one such critic:
History is about events and interpretations, not about forces and processes. Its strength lies in its non-deterministic grounding in narrative, myth, and story. When practiced as a humanistic study, a fully contextualized history (of science and technology) does indeed have the ability to illuminate today 's STS issues. (p. 50) To criticize Winner's (1997a) statements, Cutcliffe (1997) used a metaphor of technological determinism as a dragon that has been truly slain. He said that Winner's critique of contemporary technological society may be perceived as overly pessimistic. In spite of this debate, we could review some literature on the historical perspectives of technological innovation and applications (Lafollette & Stine, 1991) , on how, when, or why individuals, societies, governments, and industries have made choices regarding the use of technologies; but we are interested just in the main idea of these topics:
A new technology presents society with new capabilities, accompanied by new moral dilemmas; sometimes, society's desires and dissatisfactions stimulate development of a technical solution; at other times, technologies may be rejected or remaindered. Technological developments represent neither automatically reliable nor necessarily positive outcomes. (Lafollette & Stine, 1991, p. 1) Based on this ambivalence, this article attempts to establish a relation between civilization, modern technology, and development, which is the essence of the eighth International Conference on Management of Technology. In the first part, we present a short discussion of the concepts of modern technology and technological determinism. Second, the ambivalence of technological development is unveiled. Finally, to attain our objective, the debate is presented on the issue of whether the current management of technology (MOT) contributes to the guidance of technological development on the basis of "social priorities."
Modern and Ancient Technology
In his study of technology as an "emergent hazardous concept," Leo Marx (1997) stated that the scientific understanding of the history of technology shared with the history of human development is very recent: "The fact is that during the last few seconds, as it were, of the millennia of recorded human history, the concept of technology-in our sense of its meaning-did not exist" (p. 966). In fact, from the Greek origins of the words techne and logos, techne can be interpreted as skill of hand, or technique, whereas the word logos can be interpreted as knowledge or science. Accordingly, technology can be viewed as a knowledge of skills or techniques, or a science of skills or techniques.
Based on these meanings of technology, a difference arises between technological knowledge (technology) and technical knowledge. On one hand, technological knowledge means the experimental and systematic knowledge of effective means to reach an end. It is the kind of knowledge interested in how to do the things (i.e., know-how). It cannot be confused with just "organized knowledge to produce goods," or confused with machines, equipment, and processes produced by this knowledge. On the other hand, technical knowledge is the operative knowledge of effective means to achieve ends. It is related to the practical know-how rather than theoretical knowledge. Also, the confusion between technology and technique is well illustrated by Freeman's (1974) discussion on the relation between technology and society. Freeman argued that if we mean technology to mean a body of knowledge related to the production or acquisition of food, clothing, shelter, and other human requirements, then all societies have used technology (even when the word did not exist). Until recently, knowledge of the "mechanic arts" were based on manual and visual abilities, and the practical experience was transmitted from one generation to another by some kind of learning by doing. The connotation of technology as a more formal body of knowledge was adopted by the common usage when the production techniques reached a stage of complexity in which these traditional methods were not enough anymore.
If technology as a body of "more theoretical" knowledge implies the systematization of a set of techniques and the relations among those existent ones, then technological development is something more than the massive importation of modern technologies or techniques, as it occurs in the case of underdeveloped countries. It would be given the capability of creating and using techniques of diverse kinds depending on the needs and specific conditions of the problems to solve. Perhaps, one of the most recent definitions of technology lies in its social aspects based on the fact that technology comprises a strong knowledge component, as we could infer from the discussion; and this component can be transferred by social interactions:
Technology comprises the ability to recognize technical problems, the ability to develop new concepts and tangible solutions to technical problems, the concepts and tangibles developed to solve technical problems, and the ability to exploit the concepts and tangibles in an effective way. (Aution & Laamanen, 1995, p. 647) The main inference encapsulated in this discussion on the concept of technology relies on the differences between ancient and modern technology definitions. For Mitcham (1994) , the former refers to guidance primarily on sensimotor skills, technical maxims, and descriptive laws, whereas the latter uses these resources plus technological rules and theories. As Mitcham wrote, these technological rules and theories undermine the importance of skills and maxims, and he recommended exploration of the ways that these technological rules and theories are made possible by modern science and how they, in turn, make possible something like engineering design: "This is a need, that is, for a more profound, not to say metaphysical, interpretation of the epistemology of technological knowledge" (Mitcham, 1994, p. 207) . In short, it is the inherently technological character of science that gives technology the sense of modernity. For this reason, Thorstein Veblen (quoted in Leo Marx, 1997) , who popularized the idea of technology more than anybody else, said, "The factor in the modern situation that is alien to the ancient regime is the machine technology, with its many and wide ramifications" (p. 976), giving all credits to the innovative way of making and doing to transform the mental processes of those who used it.
Technological Determinism: The Empire Strikes Again
Having introduced this article with the debate on technological determinism, we go deeper into explain-ing Winner's (1997) motivation to participate in the debate. We start by noting that the name for the belief that technology acts as an independent force in our lives is "technological determinism," and, for instance, we have become the servant of technology instead of its master (Volti, 1988) .
Based on this concept, there is no doubt that technology exerts influence on social, political, and economic relations. While making technology the centerpiece of the theory of social change, Ogburn (quoted in Volti, 1988) , an American sociologist in the 1930s, popularized the concept of "cultural lag"-the idea that habits, thoughts, values, and social arrangements often fail to change at the same speed as technological innovation: "Technology moves ahead, but many other things lag behind" (Volti, 1988, p. 224) . In regard to this idea, Winner (1997a) pointed to Steward Brand, who warns his Wired magazine readers "Technology is rapidly accelerating and you have to keep up." As a part of the debate, Cutcliffe (1997) replied that "The obvious lesson being that, to mix metaphors badly, if you do not keep up, you will be bulldozed aside, if not steamrollered over" (p. 51).
This criticism referring to Winner's arguments is supported by the fact that before this debate was presented, Winner (1979) did not consider that technology had become an autonomus force out of human control; he disclosed that determinism (technological change as the main cause of social changes, taken as unavoidable by human beings) is too strong and underestimated "the genuine options that outcome in both the practice and the technical and social formation" (p. 26). He preferred a "more revealing" notion of technological somnambulism: "The interesting problem of our times is that we walk sleeping voluntarily through the construction process of the conditions for human existence" (Winner, 1979, p. 26) .
To stimulate the debate 20 years later, Winner (1997b) stated, "Unstoppable, strongly deterministic, technology-centered processes rule our times" (p. 1). In searching for the origins of Winner's (1997b) contradiction, we found that about 40 years ago, debates about technology and society mainly focused on what were widely (but by no means uniformly) believed to be essential features of technology and technological change. Many social scientists argued that the development and use of technology followed a fairly unique linear path, the technological change was a kind of univocal, determining force with a momentum and was highly predictable.
Closely associated to the belief in technological determinism, there was a set of hypotheses, orientations, and perspectives called "convergence theory." According to this theory, the opportunities and demands presented by modern technology promote the convergence of all societies toward a single set of social patterns and individual behaviours. This occurs because (a) technological development requires a fixed series of steps and stages that all countries must follow; (b) technology imposes similar organizational constraints on a society; and (c) in response to technological imperatives, values and behavior patterns reflect the rational approach to life (Volti, 1988) .
As we observe, the convergence theory is highly optimistic, but Winner (1997b) revealed that the notions of determinism have optimistic and pessimistic components. On one hand, among social scientists there is an influential group oriented to the "modernization theory," which resembles the principles of the convergence theory in the belief that all societies move through stages of growth or stages of development linked to technological sophistication and social integration, so they could reach what was called the "take-off point" and achieve the way of life and material prosperity found in the late twentieth-century Europe and America-all to the good. Conversely, there is a pessimistic view of determinism, theories of technological society that focused on the human and environmental costs of fast technological development.
The recognition that modern technology had certain essential qualities is perhaps our major interest. It seems that during the past 25 years, there has been a great effort to show that the idea of modern technology as a univocal, unilinear force is completely wrong (Winner, 1997b) , based on the fact that instrumental equipment and techniques as well as the way we use and interpret them are underlined by a complicated "social shaping" and social contruction. In his 1997 debate proposal, Winner (1997a) One of the most interesting current topics is that related to neutrality of technology. About the controversy of whether technology is neutral, Lujan (1989) brought out the ideological neutrality of technology. He wrote that in many cases, technology depends on the political, social, and economic interests of social groups so that technology is coherent with the ideology of these groups. In that case, for example, modern computing technology is compatible with conservative, liberal, socialist ideologies, and so on; consequently, technology is considered to be ideologically neutral.
Conversely, in the case in which there is no compatibility between certain technologies and some models of society (including the theoretical ones) and, by extension, between those technologies and the ideology that defends the model of society, we should examine why that happens. All this leads to the study of the relations between technology and society and, specifically, the possible autonomy of technology. In regard to this autonomy, discussed before as technological determinism, McLuhan (1964) argued the following in the 1960s:
Technology changes society independently of the purpose. Because technology and its use have an end, there is the belief that technology is a means to reach an end and for instance, only from the ends we can derive goodness and evilness. (pp. 30-31)
As we mentioned previously, technology is an ambivalent concept: Although some technologies are unequivocally evil, destructive, and developed to kill, there are some others that are unequivocally benign, which are used to cure and to contribute to life. Thus, technology can be good or evil, and this inherent ambivalence is the centerpiece for the debate of Luddites and Technocrats (Marx, 1997) . Also, authors like Winner (1997b) affirm that rather than relying on good or evil, the ambivalence of technology relies on the optimistic and pessimistic versions of technological change. For Christensen (1997) , the ambivalence of technology depends on whether some factors are considered: the needs of a company's customers; and the expertise, capital, and suppliers energy, and rationale to develop and implement the needed new technology both competitively and effectively. If this is the case, a new technology is sustained; otherwise, it is disruptive when these factors are not considered. Based on Fricker (1997) , technology is liberating if it attempts to satisfy human needs; otherwise, it is enslaving.
For some social scientists (e.g., Lafollette & Kline, 1991) the darker side of technology becomes the twentieth-century dilemma:
In spite of electrical plugs, garbage disposers, telephones, and even canning machines represent seemingly beneficial positive technologies (one normally cheered with enthusiasm or, at least, greeted with relief that some odious task has been simplified or eliminated), not all technology appears to be benign, however. (p. 9)
In their book Technology and Choice, Lafollette and Kline (1991) presented some historical perspectives on innovation and application of technology through the study of some cases of undesired consequences of technological change. On the other hand, some authors like Garcia Bacca (1968 Bacca ( , 1989 ) rely on both classical philosophy and modern science to present technology as "the essential humanization of the world." As Mitcham (1994) said of Garcia Bacca, "He takes modern technology as a humanization of the historical, intellectual, and social worlds. Although there are dangers in technological development, they are to be met through the same development" (pp. 34-35).
Lafollete and Kline (1991) 
MOT and the Social Control of Technology
Coming back to Winner's (1997b) work on technological determinism and change, we have to consider his article "Technology Today: Utopia or Dystopia?" which shows a new ideology underlining the computing and telecommunications technology. This idea resembles Lujan (1989) and his "ideological neutrality of technology." In fact, Winner (1997b) discloses that there is a cyberlibertarianism, an ideology that relies on the utopian dreams of computers and telecommunications; it is a political ideology linked to optimistic versions of technological change and determinism. "There is a great enthusiasm for electronically mediated ways of living with radical, right-wing ideas about the proper definition of freedom, social life, economics and democracy" (Winner, 1997b (Winner, , p. 1001 .
A criticism arises at this point referring to the discriminating effects of this ideology. First of all, it seems that the so-called computer revolution, information society, network nation, interactive media, virtual reality, and digital society are terms that change and do not have meaning for people "who do not have ambition, and intensity to focus on processes and customers and candidates for the discard piles-the poor, disabled and working class elderly" (Winner, 1997b, p. 991) . But the challenge for social scientists and for the managers of technology will be to answer the question of what to do with these people. Should they be excluded from the technological development benefits?
Another criticism of the cyberlibertarian ideology relies on the apprehensions of some underdeveloped countries that technologies developed in industrialized and modernized countries will result in the disruption of traditional social and cultural patterns. In some countries, these apprehensions have motivated a return to traditional cultural patterns (Volti, 1988) . For some people, this is nothing more than the reaction toward globalization, which in the case of digital technologies tries to act as a cultural solvent. As Volti wrote: "Every society has its distintive characteristics, and a particular technology will not neccesarily produce identical social consequences for all that employ it" (p. 227). Also, as some authors declare, there is no empirical evidence that technology acts as a universal cultural solvent (Winner, 1997b) .
But Winner (1997b) , being ahead of these criticisms, wrote that today's technology utopians ignore questions such as: Who stands to gain and who to lose in the new order of things? How will power be distributed in a throughly digitalized society? Will the institutions and practices of cyberspace eliminate existing patterns of social injustice or amplify them? Will the promised democratization benefit the whole populace or just those who own the latest electronic equipment? Who will decide these issues? In regard to these questions, Winner (1997b) denounced that cyberlibertaries, prophets of re-engineering, and some other technological optimists do not offer any answer.
To answer these questions, Volti (1988) provided, a decade ago, a discussion of the fact that social scientists think of society as a homogeneous term, but society has representatives full of conflicts, stresses, and unequal distribution of power, making these divisions important for the pattern of technological change. Some technologies serve the interests (or ideology) of a particular group, sometimes in opposition to the interests or ideology that support other groups. The main inference from this statement relies on the fact that at the time of considering the effects of a specific technology influencing people's concerns, it brings not only the presumed "imperatives" but also the key human agents of that technology, the institutions in which they operate, and how they influence the course of technological change.
In discussing all these aspects, the main questions arising are the following: What can technology studies contribute toward the guidance of technological development on the basis of "societal priorities"? Who is "guiding"? What are "societal priorities"? What does it entail? Why will it define them? Have technology studies not convincingly demonstrated that processes of sociotechnical development are very heterogeneous and that there is no "central point" from which they are "directed"? (Elzen, Enserink, & Smit, 1996; Roe Smith & Marx, 1994) . Analysts of technological development could explore possibilities to implement "societal priorities" on the basis of "research in action"-that is, by making suggestions to various actors who are attempting to solve concrete problems, and by analyzing why these suggestions are (or are not) picked up, and how this affects the subsequent development process (Elzen et al., 1996; Sclove, 1997) .
Because there are many actors involved in the process, a technology studies approach should analyze "the existing situation and its dynamics" and then should evaluate the likely effects of possible new inputs into the process and, eventually, it should implement these. Elzen et al. (1996) suggested five requirements for a framework of analysis when seeking to influence technological development on the basis of societal priorities:
1. Tracing of the factors that "guide" various actors in their acts (interactions with other actors and with technology we are interested in). 2. Analysis of these factors in a dynamic way (they can be subject to change). 3. Acknowledgment of the continuous change in both technological and social aspects of the process. 4. Recognition of some stable patterns in sociotechnical development (structural factors should be allowed that give continuity in the process). 5. Accounting for the different meanings that different actors attribute to the technology in question.
On the other hand, authors like Roe Smith and Marx (1994) wrote that technologies are not autonomous but are social products susceptible to democratic controls, which is a key issue in democratic theory. Beyond that, some authors (e.g., Borgmann, 1989; López Cerezo, Méndez, & Todt, 1998; Sclove, 1995 Sclove, , 1997 focus their social studies of technology on public participation. Sclove is perhaps one of the most convinced defenders of the idea of giving people more participation in scientific and technological issues and limiting the growing role of the experts in society. Sclove's view not only brings together Winner's critical philosophy of technology and Barber's (1984) concept of strong democracy but he explains why he has attempted to awake somnambulists and reconnect the different actors with science and technology. He seeks the return of more participation and a more active role of people in the decision making that affects their lives. Sclove (1995 Sclove ( , 1997 proposed to rebuild the social structures weakened by unrestrained modern technology and aimed for a conscious decision to take responsibility for the world in which we live, and he gave some steps for building a more sustainable society. Also, López Cerezo et al. (1998) analyzed the motivation and the conditions of public participation as well as the main institutional initiatives both practical and proposed, to make technological change more democratic. For them, "The relationships between technology and society are currently in a process of political renegotiation" (p. 282), and they agree with Sclove's arguments that the judgments of nonexperts are as reasonable as those of experts. Sclove (1997) went further and stated that research agendas, carried out on behalf of private enterprise, the military, and national governments, or in the pursuit of the scientific community's intellectual interests, often favor elite groups, helping them to maintain positions of privilege; also, Sclove pointed out that "research should be done by the people for the people" (p. 541). Also, MacRae (1981) wrote, "Ignorance can limit the ability of citizens and their representatives to control the course of technological development. . . . When public choice depends on expert information, experts and not the electorate will supply and evaluate this information" (p. 497).
Some others like Volti (1988) affirm that if that happens on a widespread scale, democracy becomes an illusion; citizens can do nothing but accept the judgments of experts and hope that they are right. In regard to making technological change more democratic through public participation, is the current MOT contributing to that goal? Who has the responsibility for practicing MOT processes on the basis of social priorities? To answer these questions, we should start by defining the practice of MOT:
It is the design and use of the means needed within organizations to achieve economic and social objectives through technological innovation. It is a human skill, combining elements of engineering, science and management techniques, which is needed by organizations in order that they may fulfill their technological capabilities and thus maximize their strategic and competitive advantage in the market place. (The National Research Council, 1989, p. 15) As has been stated, MOT is "the human skill" and it needs the integration of technology strategy and business strategy, which also requires the deliberate coor-dination of research, production, and service function with the marketing, finance, and human resources functions of the firm (Dussage, Hart, & Ramanantsa, 1992) . In spite of the "human" components of MOT, in reviewing some literature on MOT (Brady et al., 1997; Collins, Gardiner, Heaton, Macrosson, & Tait, 1991; Drejer, 1997; Fricker, 1997; Illori & Irefin, 1997; Jones, 1998) , we cannot find the contribution of current practice of MOT to the democratization process of technological change, nor can we find encouragement of public participation. Conversely, the contribution of connecting people and information for innovation to MOT is recognized (Birchall & Chanaron, 1998) . Nevertheless, authors like Borgmann (1989) support the idea that the restoration of a genuine well-being in our public and private lives can be reached only if the reform of technology and the renovation of democracy are implemented at the same time.
We find in the literature on MOT practices that it stresses the changes within business that are necessary to exploit the potential of technology rather than the management of technological change (Savage, 1990) . Another finding relies on the lack of agreement on the definition of technology connected with MOT (Drejer, 1997) . In any case, the work of engineers is recognized as an example of rational search for the best way of attaining particular ends; in our case, the ends should include the setting of "social priorities" for directing and controlling technological development. However, as Zussman (1985) noted, "Engineers rarely have the privilege of selecting these ends or even comprehending what they are. Indeed, once they do, they no longer act as engineers" (p. 58). Whether engineers lose their technical virtuosity when they are promoted to managerial positions, the issue of how the professional abilities of engineers make them effective participants in the goal-selection process will prospectively become more and more relevant for successful MOT.
Conclusions
The relation between civilization, modern technology, and development is a complex relation of correspondence that is supported by the historical perspective of technological change. Here, the idea of technological determinism acts as a pivot that articulates those three variables.
To establish this relation, we started by defining modern technology. As stated, it is the inherently technological character of science that gives technology the quality of being "modern." In this case, technology means a body of knowledge related to the production or acquisition of food, clothing, shelter, and other human requirements that all civilizations have needed through recorded history, even when the word "technology" did not exist.
Also, by taking technological determinism as a pivot, we attempted to connect modern technology with technological development within the academic debate on the validity of technological determinism at different times-decades ago, when many social scientists argued that the development and use of technology followed a fairly unique linear path and that technological change was a kind of univocal, determining force with a highly predictable momentum. Afterward, the idea of technology being "deterministic" was refused by some, based on the fact that technologies, and the way we use and interpret them, were socially shaped. Finally, the return of the idea of technological determinism is supported by the perception that institutions and individuals are driven by ineluctable technological change in the field of computers and communications.
By presenting this new debate on the controversy of whether these modern technologies act as universal cultural solvents, public participation in the decisionmaking process regarding technological change must be taken into account. It reinforces the democratic control of technological development.
Nevertheless, at the time of reviewing some literature on MOT, it has been quite impossible to find the contribution of current practice of MOT to the democratization process of technological change, nor have we found encouragement of public participation. The decision making on technology issues still relies on the experts, engineers among them, who need better understanding before setting the "social priorities" for directing and controlling technological development.
